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Labor Law: Sympathy Strikes Under the Minnesota
Public Employment Relations Act
Two bargaining units of St. Paul city employees, I represented by
Council 91 of the American Federation of State, County and Munici-
pal Employees, commenced a lawful primary strike2 against the city
of St. Paul.3 Anticipating the establishment of picket lines by Council
91, the city advised' its other employees that honoring Council 91's
picket lines would constitute a sympathy strike5 in violation of the
Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) .' In
response, representatives of the nonstriking employees sought a dec-
laratory judgment that honoring the primary strikers' picket lines
would not violate PELRA.7 The district court ruled that sympathy
1. The two units were composed of technical and clerical workers. General Driv-
ers Local 120 v. City of St. Paul, 270 N.W. 2d 877, 878 (Minn. 1978).
2. A primary strike is a work stoppage involving only those employees who are
participants in the dispute that resulted in the strike. See Kaynard v. Local 282,
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 275 F. Supp. 19, 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
3. The city had refused Council 91's request to submit the dispute to binding
arbitration. 270 N.W.2d at 878. Under the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Rela-
tions Act (PELRA), MINN. STAT. §§ 179.61-.76 (1978), public employee strikes are legal
when the employer refuses to accept binding arbitration as an impasse resolution
technique. Id. § 179.64(7); see notes 30-32 infra and accompanying text.
4. This notification was contained in a memorandum dated May 24, 1976, two
days prior to the commencement of Council 91's strike. Appellants' Brief and Appen-
dix at 4, General Drivers Local 120 v. City of St. Paul, 270 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1978).
5. A sympathy strike occurs when a bargaining unit not involved in a contract
dispute with the employer honors the picket line of a striking bargaining unit that is
involved in the dispute. The sympathy strikers need not be employees of the struck
employer, although they usually are. See notes 40-45 infra and accompanying text.
6. MINN. STAT. §§ 179.61-.78 (1978). In addition to the May 24th memorandum,
see note 4 supra, the city also sent a letter to employees who did not appear at work
on the first day of the strike. Appellants' Brief and Appendix, supra note 4, at 5. Each
letter stated,
You are not a member of a unit that has the legal right to strike and you
are, therefore, engaged in an illegal strike. By the terms of the state law, an
illegal strike can subject you to disciplinary action, including suspension or
termination of employment. Failure to report to work is direct insubordina-
tion by you to a proper and lawful order and is violative of the Personnel
Rules and is also subject to disciplinary action.
I am, therefore, ordering you to report to your supervisor for work for
your next normal work shift.
Id. at A-12 (letter to Douglas H. Nevin, city employee). If the strike were found to be
illegal, the strikers were subject to several penalties, including termination of employ-
ment, probation for up to two years, and loss of pay for all days on which they were
on strike. See MiNN. STAT. § 179.64 (1978).
7. 270 N.W.2d at 879. The unions also sought an injunction to prevent the city
from taking any disciplinary action against the union membership. Id.
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strikes by public employees were not permitted under PELRA. The
Minnesota Supreme Court, four justices dissenting, affirmed the trial
court decision, holding that the exceptions to the prohibition against
strikes in PELRA apply only to the bargaining units directly involved
in a dispute and do not extend to other bargaining units. General
Drivers Local 120 v. City of St. Paul, 270 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1978).
At common law, public employees were not allowed to engage in
either primary or sympathy strikes." This absolute prohibition has
been challenged in recent years, however, as the dramatic rise in
public employment' has increased the bargaining power of public
employees. This enhanced bargaining power, coupled with an in-
crease in the political activity of the public employees,"' has precipi-
tated several strikes that, although illegal," have undoubtedly en-
8. Head v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 288 Minn. 496, 507, 182 N.W.2d 887, 894
(1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971). See also Bennett v. Gravelle, 451 F.2d 1011,
1012 (4th Cir. 1971), appeal dismissed, 407 U.S. 917 (1972); United Fed'n of Postal
Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 882 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 802 (1971). Several
justifications have been offered for the total ban on public employee strikes. According
to supporters of the prohibition, granting public employees the right to strike would
enable them to exert undue control over public funds. See Herman, Strikes by Public
Employees: The Search for "Right Principles," 53 Cm. B. REc. 57, 62 (1971). Strike
opponents also contend that the absence of competition or profit motive in government
activities places the public employees in a stronger bargaining position than their
private counterparts. See Riggin, Public Sector Labour Disputes-Lessons to be
Learned, 4 CAN. B.A.J. July 1973, at 5. Finally, public employee strikes are generally
considered to be more harmful to the public than strikes in the private sector because
of the essential nature of many public services. See City of Webster Groves v. Institu-
tional & Pub. Employees Union, 524 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
The strike power, however, is often regarded as an essential element of any collec-
tive bargaining system seeking to achieve negotiated settlements. Bernstein,
Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARv. L. REv. 459, 463 (1971).
Without the right to strike, public employees are faced with an imbalance of power at
the bargaining table. See Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv.
931,941 (1969). Moreover, a majority of public workers now perform jobs that are often
similar to those of employees in the private sector. See Note, Applying Private Sector
Law to the Public Sector Strike in Oregon, 56 OR. L. Rrv. 251, 253 (1977).
9. In January, 1941, there were four million federal, state, and local employees
in the United States. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 53 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 1171
(1941). By December, 1978, total civilian government employment had risen to approx-
imately 15.4 million workers, a 350% increase in 37 years. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, 102 MONTHLY LAB. REv., Feb. 1979, at 77.
10. See Comment, An Analysis of the Comprehensive Approach to the Public
Employee Strike Problem, 44 Miss. L.J. 766, 769 (1973).
11. According to one commentator, the number of illegal strikes has increased
because "[tihe 'punitive and overly-rigid repressive laws [against public employee
strikes] were counterproductive. Rather than promoting labor peace by helping to
improve labor relations and prevent strikes, the laws encouraged labor unrest and
strikes and served to fuel the uncertainty." Haemmel, Government Employees and the
Right to Strike-The Final Necessary Step, 39 TENN. L. REv. 75, 83 (1971).
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couraged states to develop procedures for the peaceful resolution of
public employee bargaining disputes.'2
In the 1940's, the Minnesota Legislature addressed for the first
time the unique problem presented by unresolved labor disputes in
the public sector.' 3 The first legislation, the Charitable Hospitals
Act, 4 was passed in 1947 following employee unrest in Minnesota
hospitals. 5 This Act prohibits strikes by employees of nonprofit and
government hospitals and provides for binding arbitration as the
means of dispute resolution. In 1951, after the Minnesota Supreme
Court ruled that courts could not enjoin public employee strikes,
except those by public safety officers, 6 the Minnesota Legislature
responded with an express prohibition of all public employee strikes. 
7
Unlike the Charitable Hospitals Act, however, the legislature did not
provide for binding arbitration as a means of resolving disputes; in-
stead, an advisory impasse panel and grievance procedures were es-
tablished to allow employees to voice their complaints." In 1957, the
legislature mandated a broader approach by instructing public em-
ployers and employees to meet, with the assistance of a state-
These strikes have been effective, despite their illegality, because settlements
negotiated to end illegal strikes often contain amnesty provisions that prohibit impos-
ing penalties on the strikers. See Note, The Strike and its Alternatives: The Public
Employment Experience, 63 Ky. L.J. 430, 431 (1975).
12. Both the federal government and the states have sought to construct systems
for the peaceful resolution of public employee bargaining disputes. An important step
was taken in 1962 when President Kennedy granted federal government employees
collective bargaining rights. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 Compila-
tion), superseded by Exec. Order No. 11, 491, 3 C.F.R. 861 (1966-1970 Compilation),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301, at 576 (1976). The superseding executive order, promul-
gated by President Nixon in 1969, streamlined the procedure for determining union
representation, established a labor council to administer the program and set out a
more detailed list of unfair labor practices. See Wray, Crisis in Labor Relations in the
Federal Service: An Analysis of Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service
Under Executive Order 11491, 37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 79, 84-86 (1970). Many states
followed the federal lead, maintaining the strike prohibition but establishing dispute
settlement techniques based on mediation by impartial panels. Most states have en-
acted a public employee dispute settlement system. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
3500-3510, 3512-3526 (West 1966, Supp. 1978 & Supp. 1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
150E, §§ 1-15 (Michie 1976 & Supp. 1979); N.Y. Crv. SErv. LAW §§ 200-214 (McKinney
1973 & Supp. 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.1-.5 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1979).
13. See Note, The Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act of 1971:
Another Public Employment Experiment, 57 MINN. L. Rv. 134, 134 (1972).
14. See Act of Apr. 14, 1947, ch. 335, 1947 Minn. Laws 524 (codified at MINN.
STAT. §§ 179.35-.39 (1978)).
15. See Note, supra note 13, at 134.
16. Board of Educ. v. Public School Employees' Union Local 63, 233 Minn. 144,
152 45 N.W.2d 797, 802 (1951).




appointed mediator.'9 Under these provisions, a neutral mediator
could determine the facts underlying the dispute and offer the parties
compromise proposals, but could not force the parties to reach agree-
ment. 0 Finally, in 1965, additional measures to encourage negotiated
settlements and determine formal bargaining units were added.'
Despite these legislative efforts, public employees were dissatis-
fied because none of the procedures enacted required "employee de-
mands. . . to be formally recognized and there was no final authority
to resolve conflict."" After a protracted illegal strike by Minneapolis
teachers in 1970,2 the Minnesota Legislature also realized that these
initial steps did not give public employees the bargaining strength
necessary to avoid disruptive work stoppages.2 4 In an effort to avoid
future labor problems,25 the 1971 legislature replaced the prior statute
concerning public employees with PELRA, "a comprehensive at-
tempt to develop a bargaining relationship similar to the private
sector labor relations model."" PELRA was designed to encourage
the settlement of labor disputes through negotiations, 27 and it placed
an affirmative obligation on both employers and employees "to meet
and negotiate in good faith" about the "terms and conditions of em-
ployment." If negotiations failed to result in settlement, the 1971
Act allowed the dispute to be sent to binding arbitration21 upon the
19. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 789, § 1, 1957 Minn. Laws 1073 (repealed 1971).
In 1965, the law was changed to require parties to meet and confer. Act of May 26,
1965, ch. 839, § 2, 1965 Minn. Laws 1072 (repealed 1971).
20. Note, supra note 13, at 135.
21. See Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 839, 1965 Minn. Laws 1072 (repealed 1971).
22. Note, supra note 13, at 135.
23. The Minneapolis teachers conducted a three week illegal strike in April,
1970. The impasse was finally resolved when the teachers accepted a compromise wage
package accompanied by a no-reprisal clause preventing the school board from impos-
ing any penalties on the teachers for the illegal strike. Minneapolis Teachers Strike
Settlement Provision Circumvents Anti-strike Law, [19701 347 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP.
(BNA) B8-B9.
24. See Note, supra note 13, at 135-36.
25. The Act states that "the legislature has determined that overall policy may
best be accomplished by: . . . establishing special rights, responsibilities, procedures
and limitations regarding public employment relationships which will provide for the
protection of the rights of the public employee, the public employer and the public at
large." MINN. STAT. § 179.61 (1978).
26. Note, supra bote 13, at 136.
27. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 320 v. City of Minneapolis, 302 Minn.
410, 415, 225 N.W.2d 254, 257 (1975).
28. MmN. STAT. § 179.65(4), .66(2)-(4) (1978).
29. The method of selecting an arbitrator has remained unchanged since 1971.
The arbitration is conducted by the Public Employee Relations Board (PERB). PERB
presents a list of seven arbitrators to the disputing parties. The parties alternatively
strike names from the list until three remain or, if either party requests, until only a
single arbitrator is left on the list. Id. § 179.72 (5)-(6) (1978).
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agreement of both parties.30 The absolute prohibition against public
employee strikes, however, was continued.3 '
Because PELRA was essentially a voluntary system, it still did
not provide public employees with sufficient negotiating strength."
Recognizing this deficiency in the original Act,3 the 1973 legislature
attempted to further encourage negotiated settlements by amending
PELRA to allow public employee strikes in two situations .3  The
amendment provided nonessentiaP public employees with a defense
to an illegal strike charge if the employer either refuses to submit the
dispute to binding arbitration upon impasse36 or rejects the arbitra-
30. Id. § 179.72(10) (1971) (amended 1973).
31. Id. § 179.64(1) (1971) (amended 1973).
32. Proposed Amendments to the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Rela-
tions Act: Hearings on H.F. 295 Before the Minnesota House Comm. on Governmental
Operations, 68th Sess. Mar. 5, 1973 (statement of Representative Jack LaVoy, author
of the amendments) (tape recording available at Minnesota State Capital Legislative
Reference Library, St. Paul, Minnesota.) Representative LaVoy stated that the volun-
tary negotiation system created by the 1971 statute failed to provide public employees
with sufficient "leverage" to encourage their employers to accept reasonable terms. Id.
33. Id.
34. The 1973 amendments maintained the general strike prohibition:
No person holding a position by appointment or employment in the govern-
ment of the state of Minnesota, or in the government of any one or more of
the political subdivisions thereof, . . . may engage in a strike, nor shall any
such person or organization of such person or its officials or agents cause,
condone, instigate, encourage, or cooperate, in a strike except as may be
provided in subdivision 7.
MmN. STAT. § 179.64(1) (1978). Two exceptions to this general prohibition appeared
in subdivision 7:
Either a violation of section 179.68, subdivision 2, clause (9), [employer's
duty to comply with valid arbitration agreement], or a refusal by the em-
ployer to request binding arbitration when requested by the exclusive repre-
sentative pursuant to section 179.69, subdivision 3 or 5, is a defense to a
violation of this section, except as to essential employees.
Id. § 179.64 (7) (1978). See also note 38.
35. Strikes by essential public employees are illegal in Minnesota. MINN. STAT.
§ 179.64 (1) (1978). PELRA originally defined "essential employees" as workers "whose
employment duties involve work or services essential to the health or safety of the
public and the withholding of such services would create a clear and present danger
to the health or safety of the public." Act of Nov. 3, 1971, ch. 33, § 3, 1971 Ex. Sess.
Minn. Laws 2709. A 1979 amendment changed the definition to mean "firefighters,
police officers, highway patrolmen, guards at correctional institutions, employees of
hospitals other than state hospitals and registered nurses, as defined in section 148.171,
engaged in the practice of professional nursing and employed in a state hospital or state
nursing home." Act of June 5, 1979, ch. 332, § 58, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 934
(West) (to be codified as MNN. STAT. § 179.63(11)). Essential employee disputes that
reach the impasse stage are sent to binding arbitration. MINN. STAT. § 179.72(10)
(1978). In this Comment, all references to Minnesota public employees are to nonessen-
tial employees only, unless specifically noted otherwise.
36. Under PELRA, the Bureau of Mediation Services certifies when an impasse
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tor's decision in a dispute that has been submitted to binding arbitra-
tion.31 In 1979, two additional defenses were added for state employ-
ees. 38 By giving public employees a qualified right to strike, Minne-
sota joined a group of only seven other states that allow any type of
public employee strikes.39
The language of the PELRA provision granting the limited right
to strike does not specify whether sympathy strikes are permitted.4 1'
In the private sector, however, sympathy strikes by employees of a
common employer are clearly legal." Moreover, courts generally do
has been reached. MiNN. STAT. § 179.69(3) (1978).
37. MINN. STAT. 179.64(7) (1978). See note 34 supra.
38. Non-essential state employees are provided with a defense to an illegal strike
charge if there is a "disapproval by the legislative commission on employee relations
pursuant to section 3.985 or a failure by the legislature to approve a negotiated agree-
ment or arbitration award pursuant to section 179.74. . . ." Act of June 5, 1979, ch.
332, § 58, 1979 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 934 (West) (to be codified as MINN. STAT.
179.64(7)).
39. The following states grant a limited right to strike to public employees:
Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972); Hawaii, HAWAH REV. STAT. § 89-12 (1976);
Montana, MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-201 to -311 (1978); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §
243.726-.736 (1977); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.1003 (Purdon Supp.
1979-1980); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (1978); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.70 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979-1980).
40. For discussion of the conflicting inferences to be drawn from this omission,
see note 52 infra.
41. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 99 151-169 (1976), protects
private workers when they engage in "concerted activities" for "mutual aid or protec-
tion." Id. § 157. Courts have construed this language as permitting sympathy strikes.
See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. N.L.R.B., 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850
(1972); General Tire and Rubber Co. v. N.L.R.B., 451 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1971). Public
employees, however, are not covered by the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976). More-
over, following the United States Supreme Court opinion in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), it is unclear whether any federal attempt to con-
trol state and local government labor relations would be constitutional. In National
League of Cities, the court refused to allow the federal government to enforce the
minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 206(a), 207(a) (1976), against state and local governments, holding that
"Congress may not exercise [the power to regulate interstate commerce] so as to
force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the
conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made." 426 U.S. at 855. Com-
mentators disagree on the effect of the decision on the federal government's power to
regulate state and local public employee collective bargaining. Compare Noble &
Kilroy, The Constitutionality of a National Public Employee Relations Act: A Case
for States' Rights, 13 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 31 (1978) and Note, Constitutional Implica-
tions of a Federal Collective Bargaining Law for State and Local Government Em-
ployees, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 863, 892 (1978) with Shaller, The Constitutionality of
a Federal Collective Bargaining Statute for State and Local Employees, 8 CAP. U. L.
REV. 59, 77 (1978) ("Since the state would retain the authority to decide the terms
and conditions of employment, the encroachment on its sovereignty would not ap-
proach the threshold level found necessary to invalidate the [Fair Labor Standards
Act] 1974 Amendments in [National League of Cities].").
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not require employees to cross picket lines established against em-
ployers other than their own.2 Describing the status of private sector
sympathy strikers, one court stated that "sympathy strikers stand in
the same shoes as the striker with whom they sympathize." 3 This
legal attitude is highly valued by organized labor because sympathy
strikes not only increase the economic pressure on the employer, but
also reinforce the feeling of solidarity among all unionized workers.4
In General Drivers, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
sympathy strikes 5 are not permitted under PELRA's exception to the
general strike prohibition allowing employees to strike when the em-
ployer refuses the workers' request to submit the dispute to binding
arbitration." The court reasoned that this exception permits strikes
42. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1547 (1962), enforced
sub nom., Teamsters Local 79 v. N.L.R.B., 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 905 (1964) ("[T]he employees of Redwing engaged in protected concerted
activity when they refused to cross the. . . picket line [established by workers striking
against the Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation]."). See also T. KIm L, LABOR
LAw, § 30.05, at 30-183 (1976) ("The Board and the courts have interpreted [§ 8(b)(4)
of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976)] to protect the right of employees
of a secondary employer, in the case of a lawful primary strike, to refuse to cross the
primary picket line.") But see N.L.R.B. v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162, 165, n.1
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 957 (1978) ("[when employees] honor .. .
stranger unions' picket lines at another employer's premises .. . [s]uch conduct is
arguably unprotected. . . inasmuch as the. . . employees' self-interest is not directly
or indirectly implicated in the primary strike.").
43. Newspaper Prod. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 503 F.2d 821, 828 (5th Cir. 1974); see
N.L.R.B. v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299, 1301 (5th Cir. 1970).
44. Judge Learned Hand once described this feeling of solidarity engendered by
sympathy strikers: "[T]he immediate quarrel does not itself concern them, but by
extending the number of those who will make the enemy of one the enemy of all, the
power of each is vastly increased." N.L.R.B. v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates
Co., 130 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1942).
45. The court decided initially that honoring a picket line constitutes a "strike"
under the PELRA definition of that term:
"Strike" means concerted action in failing to report for duty, the willful
absence from one's position, the stoppage of work, slowdown, or the absti-
nence in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper performance of
the duties of employment for the purposes of inducing, influencing or coerc-
ing a change in the conditions or compensation or the rights, privileges, or
obligatons of employment.
270 N.W.2d at 879 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 179.63(12) (1978)). This definition is supple-
mented by a provision in the section that prohibits public employee strikes:
[Amn employee who is absent from any portion of his work assignment
without permission, or who abstains wholly or in part from the full perform-
ance of his duties without permission from his employer on the date or dates
when a strike occurs is prima facie presumed to have engaged in a strike on
such date or dates.
MINN. STAT. § 179.64 (3) (1978).
46. 270 N.W.2d at 880. The court phrased its holding in terms of the statutory
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only by bargaining units directly involved in a dispute, because only
those units can make the request for arbitration required by the ex-
ception." In support of its interpretation, the majority found that the
exception's provision that only "the exclusive representative"'4 , of the
bargaining unit in the dispute can request arbitration reflects a legis-
lative recognition that separate bargaining units are an important
means of preventing "disputes involving some public employees from
automatically expanding to involve all public employees and thus
paralyzing an entire governmental body.""9 The court then examined
the statutory purpose and historical background of the exceptions.
According to the court, the legislature intended the exceptions to act
"only as a limited instrument for encouraging effective arbitration,"'"
and not as a reversal of the general prohibition against public em-
ployee strikes.-' Noting that, until 1973, all public employee strikes
had been prohibited, the court reasoned that if the legislature had
wished to overturn this longstanding prohibition with respect to sym-
pathy strikes, the amendments would have been phrased broadly,
unlike the limited terminology of the exceptions. 2
Contrary to what the majority opinion asserted, the express lan-
guage of the statute offers little guidance in determining the availa-
bility of sympathy strikes. As the dissenting justice recognized, the
statute does not "expressly [limit its application] to only employees
represented by the exclusive representative requesting arbitration nor
to only members of the striking bargaining unit."53 Instead of disclos-
exception permitting strikes when an employer does not submit disputes to arbitration
upon request. It is not certain, therefore, whether the court would also prohibit sympa-
thy strikes claimed to fall under the exception allowing strikes when the employer
refuses to comply with a valid arbitration decision. Because an employer who ignores
an arbitration decision engages in an unfair labor practice, see MINN. STAT. § 179.68
(2)(9) (1978), the court may be less willing to give such an employer protection against
sympathy strikes. On the other hand, because the reasoning in General Drivers appears
to apply equally well to both exceptions, the court may not have intended to limit its
holding.
47. 270 N.W.2d at 880; see note 34 supra.
48. MINN. STAT. § 179.64(7) (1978), quoted in 270 N.W.2d at 880.
49. 270 N.W.2d at 880.
50. Id. at 881.
51. Id.
52. Id. The majority also noted that two of the eight states that allow public
employee strikes, Pennsylvania and Oregon, specifically prohibit sympathy strikes. Id.
The majority cited statutes from these two states to show that a prohibition of sympa-
thy strikes was not "unprecedented." Id. The dissent, on the other hand, used the
Pennsylvania and Oregon provisions to support the position that the legislature would
have expressly prohibited sympathy strikes had it not wished them to occur. Id. at 882
(Scott, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 881 (Scott, J., dissenting).
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ing a legislative intent to prevent sympathy strikes, the exception's
requirement that only the exclusive representative of the disputing
bargaining unit request arbitration appears to serve two other unre-
lated functions. First, the exception merely identifies when a strike
can legally occur by requiring an arbitration request as a condition
precedent to application of the exception. Second, the requirement
ensures that bargaining units not involved in the primary dispute are
not able to dictate the dispute resolution technique to be used by the
conflicting parties. Thus, it does not seem as if the exception was
drafted for the purpose of prohibiting sympathy strikes.54 Neverthe-
less, the majority in General Drivers correctly recognized that the
contrary conclusion-that sympathy strikes were intended to be per-
missible under the exception-is also unlikely; had the legislature
intended to overturn the general strike prohibition it would not have
drafted the exception in the limited manner that it did.5
Like the language of the statute, the policy considerations under-
lying PELRA provide no satisfactory resolution to the sympathy
strike question. The traditional ban on all public employee strikes
reflected a fear that such work stoppages would virtually paralyze the
government." The majority's conclusion that the qualified right to
strike created in 1973 does not include the sympathy strike was based
in part on this concern. 5 Due to several factors, however, a right to
54. The dissent's attempt to construe the language of the statute to favor the
legalization of sympathy strikes is also unconvincing. Citing the rule of statutory
construction that "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other," id., Justice
Scott concluded that the express exclusion of essential employees from the exceptions
indicates a legislative preference to allow "all 'nonessential' employees to have the
right to invoke these defenses." Id. at 882. The rule of statutory construction is of little
help, however, since the exclusion of "essential employees" from the right to strike fails
to address the salient issue of whether the legislature intended that right to strike to
include sympathy strikes.
The dissenting opinion also emphasized that the Minnesota Legislature has spe-
cifically addressed the question of sympathy strikes in other contexts. With private
sector employees, the legislature denied unemployment compensation benefits to sym-
pathy strikers. See MINN. STAT. § 268.09(3) (1978). Thus, according to the dissenting
justices, the failure of the legislature to expressly address sympathy strikes in the
exceptions evidenced a legislative intent to allow such strikes. 270 N.W.2d at 882
(Scott, J., dissenting). The connection between private employee benefits and the right
of public employees to strike, however, is tenuous, at best. The unemployment com-
pensation benefits provision specifically referred to sympathy strikers because primary
strikers are clearly ineligible for such benefits. See Mni. STAT. § 268.09(3) (1978). In
the public strike situation, on the other hand, the legislature focused its attention on
the needs of primary strikers and thus was not concerned with the secondary question
of sympathy strikes.
55. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
56. See note 8 supra.
57. See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
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engage in sympathy strikes under PELRA would not necessarily lead
to paralysis. First, the right to strike granted by PELRA is limited
to nonessential employees." Second, a bargaining unit may choose
not to strike in sympathy with the primary striking unit, either be-
cause its membership does not want to forego the income lost during
a strike or because it does not wish to arouse public animosity toward
public workers. Third, government employers can easily avert an
imminent sympathy strike by choosing to submit the dispute to arbi-
tration when requested by the disputing unit. Thus, although sympa-
thy strikes could temporarily deprive the public of some governmen-
tal services, the court's fear that sympathy strikes would
"automatically . . . involve all public employees, [thereby] para-
lyzing an entire governmental body"59 is largely unwarranted.
In addition to overestimating the potential for public harm from
sympathy strikes, the court failed to give any consideration to the
effect of the decision on PELRA's goal of encouraging reasonable
settlements by providing sufficient negotiating strength to public
employees. The dissenting justices recognized that the availability of
sympathy strikes could determine the efficacy of the statutory right
to strike: "Without the effective right to engage the support of their
fellow employees, the statutory right to strike of the members of a
small unit would be meaningless, since the bargaining power exerted
by a unit is largely proportional to the size of the unit."6 Indeed,
during oral argument in the General Drivers case, the city of St. Paul,
presumably acting on the assumption that no sympathy strike would
occur, "candidly admitted that the City deliberately refused to arbi-
trate because . . . it believed it would fare better in a strike."'6'
It is apparent, therefore, that as a result of the General Drivers
decision, PELRA's objective of developing "a bargaining relationship
similar to the private sector labor relations model" 2 will remain
largely unattained. Without the assistance of other bargaining units,
public employees might decide that they will receive more favorable
terms by compromising during the negotiating stage rather than risk-
ing the harm and uncertainties that accompany a strike. At the same
time, government employers, assured of the illegality of sympathy
strikes, will tend to become more confident of their ability to endure
strikes. As a result, employers will not only be less likely to offer
reasonable terms during the negotiating stage, but also will be more
58. See note 35 supra.
59. 270 N.W.2d at 880.
60. Id. at 883 (Scott, J., dissenting).
61. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 3, n.1, General Drivers Local 120 v. City
of St. Paul, 270 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1978).
62. See Note, supra note 13, at 136.
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willing to permit strikes to occur when an impasse is reached.13
Because PELRA does not discuss sympathy strikes, either di-
rectly or indirectly, the court in General Drivers was forced to choose
between the two extremes of either generally permitting or totally
prohibiting sympathy strikes. In light of the conflicting policy consid-
erations, neither of these choices would have been satisfactory. Yet,
it would have been improper judicial behavior, in view of the scant
statutory guidance, for the court to impose a compromise solution on
the parties. Rather, the permissibility of sympathy strikes is a ques-
tion for the legislature, 4
The possible legislative solutions to the sympathy strike issue
cannot be adequately assessed, however, until a more fundamental
issue is resolved: The extent to which public employees should be
given negotiating strength commensurate with that of their employ-
ers. Two factors have been responsible for the traditional absence of
bargaining parity between public employers and employees. First,
legislators have feared that allowing bargaining parity would permit
public employees to have a substantial impact on public spending,
thereby resulting in undue employee influence on the political deci-
sionmaking process. 5 Second, it has been contended that, given suffi-
cient negotiating strength, public employees would regularly deprive
the public of essential services.6
The strength of these rationales for maintaining unequal bar-
gaining power, however, is uncertain. It seems unlikely that restric-
tions on public employee bargaining power are necessary to protect
the public from undue incursions by government employees into the
political process. Given that public opinion polls have consistently
found that the general public does not approve of granting public
employees the right to strike,67 government officials are more likely
to listen to constitutent sentiment opposing strikes than to be coerced
by union pressures for settlement.
The argument that bargaining parity would result in a loss of
essential public services is also unconvincing. According to some
63. An additional potential consequence of General Drivers is that bargaining
units in Minnesota may become larger in order to increase their bargaining power.
64. See 270 N.W.2d at 881.
65. See Herman, supra note 8, at 62.
66. See City of Webster Groves v. Institutional & Pub. Employees Union, 524
S.W.2d 162, 166 (Mo. 1975); note 8 supra.
67. In February, 1978, the Gallup Poll reported that a majority of Americans
opposes granting the right to strike to teachers, firefighters, and police. [1978] 746
GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 15. Similarly, a recent Harris Poll found that most
Americans oppose giving a right to strike to teachers, firefighters, and police, but




scholars in the public labor relations field, providing public employ-
ees with bargaining parity wuld reduce the number of 'disputes that
would otherwise result in strikes . 8 With equality of negotiating
power, neither side would be capable of successfully pressing unrea-
sonable demands on the other, because the unreasonable party could
not expect to emerge victorious from a strike. Moreover, as noted
earlier, several aspects of the Minnesota law decrease the potential
for harm from public employee strikes."
Permitting public employees to engage in sympathy strikes could
lead to bargaining parity in Minnesota by increasing the negotiating
power of public employees. Yet, even though public employers could
still choose between an arbitrated decision and a potential strike, "
giving public employees an unlimited right to honor picket lines
might shift the balance of negotiating power too far in the employees'
favor. The fears of undue political influence and government para-
lysis could become legitimate if public employees were given exces-
sive negotiating strength. If unlimited sympathy strikes were al-
lowed, the government would be faced with the threat of a strike by
all nonessential employees in every contract negotiation, regardless
of the size or demands of the bargaining unit negotiating. Should
such a widespread strike continue for more than a short period of
time, the loss of public services would be substantial, and govern-
ment officials would be more likely to accede to what may be unrea-
sonable demands by the employees.
Because of the harm that could occur if the balance of negotiat-
ing strength shifted too far toward the employees in the public sec-
tor, it is important that the legislature resolve the sympathy strike
issue in a way that will protect the public from harm and ensure the
integrity of the political process. One possible solution would be to
amend PELRA to permit sympathy strikes generally, but allow the
governor to seek an injunction to halt any strikes that materially en-
danger the health, safety, or welfare of the citizenry.7 1 Under this
68. See, e.g., Kheel, supra note 8, at 941 ("In an environment conducive to real
bargaining, strikes will be fewer and shorter than in a system where employees are in
effect invited to defy the law in order to [strike]."). See also Bernstein, supra note 8,
at 463 ("While potentially very destructive weapons, strikes are seldom employed;
their salutary persuasive effect results from the mere existence of the possibility of a
strike. What damages strikes cause are, arguably, the relatively small price paid to
make collective bargaining work.").
69. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
71. This option would be analogous to the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-168, 171-183, 185-187 (1976), that allow the President to seek
an injunction against any strike that endangers the health, safety, or welfare of the
public. Some states use the injunction as a tool to control the availability of primary
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plan, employees would have substantial bargaining power, yet signi-
ficant disruptions of public services could be avoided. Furthermore,
the danger of undue political influence by public employees would be
reduced because government officials would probably not be coerced
into a settlement if there were less danger of a long-term deprivation
of public services. This option, however, could potentially be mani-
pulated by a governor using this power selectively to favor individuals
or organizations for political reasons. On the other hand, it might be
politically unwise for the governor to appear to abuse this authority,
since an unwarranted decision to seek an injunction could weaken
political support from organized labor. Similarly, a decision not to
seek an injunction when such action is appropriate would alienate
the general public, which would be well aware of the deprivation of
government services.
Bargaining parity between public employers and employees
could also be achieved without amending PELRA to allow sympathy
strikes. A unique method of dispute resolution in the public sector
has been used for several years in Canada. This "Canadian Plan"72
allows employees to choose the technique of impasse resolution that
will be used if a deadlock occurs. The employees may choose either
to submit the dispute to binding arbitration or to a conciliation board
for mediation.3 If mediation is unfavorable, the employees have a
right to strike. 4 The choice, however, must be made at the outset of
negotiations 5 so that employees do not gain the added advantage of
being able to choose the technique that would best resolve the im-
passe in their favor once deadlock is reached. Under PELRA, by
public employee strikes by permitting government employers to enjoin their employ-
ees' strikes whenever public health or safety is endangered. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §
243.726(3) (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(7m)(b) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
72. See Coughlin & Rader, Right to Strike and Compulsory Arbitration: Panacea
or Placebo? 58 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 220 (1975). The plan, enacted in 1966, applies to
Canadian federal employees. Public Service Staff Relations Act, ch. 72, § 1 (1966-67)
(codified at CAN. Rav. STAT. ch. P-35 (1970)).
73. CAN. REv. STAT. ch. P-35, § 36(1) (1970). Section 36(1) allows the bargaining
agent for an employee bargaining unit to choose either of two processes for resolution
of a dispute contained in the definition section of the act. Id. The bargaining agent
may choose either "referral of the dispute to arbitration" or "referral thereof to a
conciliation board." Id. ch. P-35, § 2. Disputes referred to the conciliation board are
mediated. If mediation is unsuccessful, strikes are permitted seven days after the
conciliation board reports to the parties on the results of the mediation. Id. ch. P-35,
§ 101(2)(b).
74. Only "nondesignated" employees are permitted to strike under the Canadian
Plan. Id. ch. P-35, § 101. "Designated" employees are those workers who perform
duties "which at any particular time or after any specified period of time is or will be
necessary in the interest of the safety or security of the public." Id. ch. P-35, § 79(1).
75. Id. ch. P-35, § 37(2).
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contrast, the employer not only selects the means of impasse resolu-
tion, but also waits until an impasse has occurred to make that selec-
tion.7 By allowing employees to select the impasse procedure, the
Canadian Plan results in substantial equality of bargaining power;
employers are deprived of the ability to prevent public employees
from striking. Yet, this gain in bargaining strength is tempered by the
fact that the employees must choose their method of dispute resolu-
tion at the beginning of the negotiations. By forcing this early choice,
the plan prevents employees from gaining the additional advantage
of being able to select the method that appears most favorable to
them in light of the circumstances present when impasse occurs.
If the Canadian Plan were adopted, the sympathy strike would
no longer appear to be necessary to assist employees in achieving a
just settlement. The small bargaining units, which have the greatest
need for sympathy strikes, 77 would simply choose arbitration and thus
would not be forced into a strike that would be ineffective due to the
size of the unit. It seems, therefore, that PELRA's objective of estab-
lishing the bargaining parity necessary to achieve reasonable settle-
ments would be realized under the Canadian Plan.7 1
It is unfortunate that neither the option allowing the governor to
seek to enjoin sympathy strikes nor the Canadian Plan was available
to the General Drivers' court. By choosing to prohibit all sympathy
strikes rather than create the potential for government paralysis, the
Minnesota Court left public employees with inadequate negotiating
strength. A legislative solution such as the gubernatorial injunction
power or the Canadian Plan, is necessary, therefore, to realize
PELRA's objective of minimizing public employee labor disputes by
equalizing the bargaining strength of the parties.
76. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
77. The relationship between the size of the bargaining unit and the amount of
negotiating strength the unit has varies among different occupations, of course, de-
pending on how essential the services performed are thought to be.
78. Amendment of PELRA to conform to the Canadian Plan could encounter at
least one obstacle-the nondelegation doctrine. According to this principle, legislative
authority cannot be delegated to an agency of the government unless the agency, in
carrying out the delegation, is required to conform to standards set forth by the legisla-
ture. Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 112-13, 36 N.W.2d 530, 538 (1949). Binding
arbitration, some argue, illegally delegates the contracting power of the governmental
body to the arbitrator. A recent Minnesota Supreme Court case, however, ruled that
PELRA's compulsory binding arbitration for essential employees was not an improper
delegation of legislative authority. City of Richfield v. Local 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Fire
Fighters, 276 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Minn. 1979). The court concluded that by establishing
standards to guide the decisions of the arbitrators, PELRA did not improperly delegate
legislative authority. Although the case involved only essential employees, the court's
rationale for upholding the compulsory binding arbitration provisions of PELRA did
not appear to depend on the essential nature of the employees' services. Thus, the
nondelegation doctrine should not bar the use of the Canadian Plan in Minnesota.
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